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PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 16-2644  
_______________ 
 
ANTHONY ALLEN, for himself and as parent of A.A.; 
TODD BENNETT, for himself and as a parent of E.B.; 
SCOTT EDELGLASS; SHARIR FELDMAN, for himself 
and as parent of A.F. and J.F.; WERNER GRAF, for himself 
and as parent of A.G. and A.G.;  
KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. 
and C.H.; CLIFTON HILL, for himself and as parent of A.H.; 
SAMIR JOSHI, for himself and as parent of J.J., J.J. and J.J.; 
YEHUDA B. LITTON; SURENDER MALHAN, for himself 
and as parent of E.M. and V.M.; CARLY OLIVIER, for 
himself and as parent of M.O.; ANTONIO QUINLAN, for 
himself and as parent of K.Q.; ZIA SHAIKH, for himself and 
as parent of M.S., S.S., and H.S. for themselves and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
LAWRENCE DEBELLO; TIMOTHY CHELL; KATHLEEN 
DELANEY; JAMES M. DEMARZO; MADELIN 
EINBINDER; MARLENE LYNCH FORD; CHRISTOPHER 
GARENGER; LAWRENCE JONES; SEVERIANO 
LISBOA; ANTHONY MASSI; JOHN TOMASELLO; 
SHERRI SCHWEITZER;  NANCY SIVILLI; MAUREEN 
SOGLUIZZO; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;  MICHELLE M. 
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SMITH, in her official capacity as Clerk, Superior Court of 
New Jersey;  JOHN L. CALL, JR., in his official capacity as 
Presiding Judge Chancery Division,  Family Part, Burlington 
County; CATHERINE L. FITZPATRICK; LISA 
THORTON; PATRICIA B. ROE, in her official capacity as 
Presiding Judge, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean 
County 
 
       (D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00760) 
 
ANTHONY ALLEN for himself and as parent of A.A.; 
TODD BENNETT, for himself and as parent of E.B.; 
SHARIR FELDMAN, for himself and as parent of A.F. and 
J.F.; 
KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. 
and C.H.; CLIFTON HILL, for himself and as parent of A.H.; 
CARLY OLIVIER, for himself and as parent of M.O.; 
ZIA SHAIKH, for himself and as parent of M.S., S.S. and 
H.S. for themselves and on behalf of all other similarly 
situated 
 
v. 
 
TIMOTHY CHELL; KATHLEEN DELANEY; JAMES 
DEMARZO; MADELIN EINBINDER, LAWRENCE 
JONES, SEVERIANO LISBOA; JOHN TOMASELLO; 
SHERRI SCHWEITZER, NANCY SIVILLI AND 
MAUREEN SOGLUIZZO 
 
(D.C. No. 3:15-cv-03519) 
 
Anthony Allen; Todd 
Bennett; Scott Edelglass;  
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Sharir Feldman; Werner 
Grag; Karl Hagberg;  
Clifton Hill; Samir Joshi; 
Yehuda B. Litton;  
Surender Malhan; Carly 
Olivier; Antonio 
Quinlan; Zia Shaikh, 
                                                                Appellants 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. Nos. 3:14-cv-00760 & 3:15-cv-03519) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
_______________ 
 
Argued November 17, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 27, 2017) 
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Paul A. Clark, Esq. [ARGUED] 
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Jersey City, NJ 07306 
 
Attorney for Appellants 
 
Daniel J. Kelly, Esq. 
Eric S. Pasternack, Esq. 
Akeel A. Qureshi, Esq. 
Benjamin H. Zieman, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
P.O. Box 112 
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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case, Plaintiffs, fathers of minor children in 
New Jersey, challenge the state law governing child custody 
proceedings between New Jersey parents. Seeking dramatic 
changes in the way New Jersey conducts these proceedings, 
Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that the “best interests 
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of the child” standard that New Jersey courts use to determine 
custody in a dispute between two fit parents is 
unconstitutional. To bring about their desired changes, 
Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act against state court judges who 
presided over their custody disputes, and seek declaratory and 
injunctive relief: a declaration that the challenged standards 
and practices are unconstitutional and unlawful, and an 
enforceable injunction against their use. But before reaching 
the merits of Plaintiffs’ arguments, we first answer a 
threshold question: whether these state court judges are 
proper defendants in this Section 1983 suit. 
  
I. Factual Background   
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations 
 
Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey’s family courts have 
unconstitutionally deprived them of custody of their children 
and have unconstitutionally interfered with their fundamental 
rights to the care, custody and control of their children 
without a full hearing, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
In addition to raising the “best interests of the child” 
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point identified above,1 Plaintiffs allege that their parental 
rights were restricted, or that they were permanently or 
temporarily separated from their children, by order of the 
New Jersey family courts without adequate notice, the right to 
counsel, or a plenary hearing, i.e. without an opportunity to 
present evidence or cross-examine. They allege that New 
Jersey state court policy, authorized by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court and Appellate Division, denies parents a 
plenary hearing when one parent loses custody to the other 
parent. Plaintiffs further assert that although mothers and 
fathers are, in theory, treated equally in custody disputes 
under New Jersey law, in practice courts favor mothers. 
Additionally, they assert that New Jersey discriminates 
against indigent parents by failing to provide them with 
counsel in a divorce proceeding or other inter-parent dispute 
that results in a loss of custody. In short, as the District Court 
explained, 
Plaintiffs interpret the United States 
Constitution as requiring that when parents 
divorce or separate, each parent has a 
fundamental right to automatically receive 50-
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs assert that a court should not deprive a parent of 
his rights unless the court finds exceptional circumstances or 
unfitness, which Plaintiffs allege is akin to the standard New 
Jersey courts use in determining whether to deprive a parent 
of custody in a dispute between a parent and non-parent. 
Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey courts should use the same 
standard when evaluating a dispute between two parents. 
They allege that using separate standards denied them the 
equal protection of the law. 
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50 custody of his or her children, and that courts 
are limited to ordering a different custody 
arrangement only upon a finding, by clear and 
convincing evidence, in a plenary hearing (and 
with a right to counsel for both parents), that 
one of the parents abuses or neglects the child 
or is otherwise an unfit parent.2 
 
This interpretation would, in the words of the District Court, 
“dramatically change the legal landscape of New Jersey and 
the laws governing child custody proceedings between 
parents.”3 
 
Plaintiffs bring suit under Section 1983 and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act4 against New Jersey state court 
judges.5 They seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring 
Defendants to, among other things, provide a plenary hearing 
within ten days to any parent who has his right to the care, 
custody, and control of his children reduced through state 
action.  
B. New Jersey’s Custody Regime 
 
Plaintiffs challenge the New Jersey state statute 
                                                 
2 A46. 
3 Id. 
4 28 U.S.C. § 2201.  
5 Plaintiffs initially sued other defendants, including the 
State of New Jersey, but those defendants were dismissed on 
bases that are not appealed here. 
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instituting the best interests of the child standard6 and the 
New Jersey courts’ policy on plenary hearings in custody 
disputes, which has not been codified by statute but instead 
developed in the state case law.7 Under this case law, a 
plenary hearing is not required in every contested motion in 
New Jersey state court; a trial judge has discretion to decide 
such a motion without a hearing.8 “It is only where the 
affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material 
fact, and that the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing 
would be helpful in deciding such factual issues, that a 
plenary hearing is required.”9 
                                                 
6 See Hand v. Hand, 917 A.2d 269, 271 (N.J. Super Ct. App. 
Div. 2007) (“Custody issues are resolved using a best 
interests analysis that gives weight to the factors set forth in 
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4 (setting out such 
factors and providing that “[t]he court shall order any custody 
arrangement which is agreed to by both parents unless it is 
contrary to the best interests of the child.”).  
7 On appeal, Plaintiffs allege that they “do not seek to have 
any statute declared unconstitutional.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 4. 
However, this contention is inconsistent with the operative 
complaint, in which they do challenge the constitutionality of 
the best interest of the child statute. 
8 Shaw v. Shaw, 351 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1976). 
9 Id.; see also Lepis v. Lepis, 416 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 1980) 
(“We therefore hold that a party must clearly demonstrate the 
existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a 
hearing is necessary . . . . Without such a standard, courts 
would be obligated to hold hearings on every modification 
application.”).  
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II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review  
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“Because this case comes to us upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations contained in the 
Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere 
conclusory statements.”10 Our review of the grant of a motion 
to dismiss is plenary.11 However, to the extent the denial of 
declaratory relief was discretionary, we review for abuse of 
discretion.12  
 
Before the District Court, the state defendants asserted 
that Plaintiffs’ suit improperly attempts to appeal concluded 
and pending state court proceedings—their final and ongoing 
divorce and custody proceedings—and that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.13 The District Court found that Rooker-Feldman did 
not apply, because Plaintiffs do not challenge the state court 
custody decisions themselves, but instead the policies 
underlying those decisions. Defendants do not raise this 
                                                 
10 James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
11 Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Grp., Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
12 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995); 
Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
13 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); 
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
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doctrine on appeal, but because we have a continuing 
obligation to determine for ourselves whether subject matter 
jurisdiction is or was in question,14 we consider the doctrine’s 
application to this suit. 
 
Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal court from 
exercising subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by 
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 
those judgments.”15 As both we and the Supreme Court have 
explained, the doctrine has narrow applicability. Rooker-
Feldman does not bar suits that challenge actions or injuries 
underlying state court decisions—and especially those that 
predate entry of a state court decision—rather than the 
decisions themselves.16 Four requirements must be met in 
                                                 
14 Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 
2002).  
15 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 
280, 284 (2005). 
16 See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (finding 
that Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction because 
“Skinner does not challenge the adverse [state court] 
decisions themselves; instead, he targets as unconstitutional 
the Texas statute they authoritatively construed”); Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 
167 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To the contrary, when the source of the 
injury is the defendant's actions (and not the state court 
judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the 
federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state 
court.”).  
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order for Rooker-Feldman to bar suit: “(1) the federal plaintiff 
lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries 
caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments 
were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the 
plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the 
state judgments.”17 
 
In line with these decisions, our Circuit previously 
found that Rooker-Feldman did not bar suit in B.S. v. 
Somerset County, whose facts were similar to those in the 
present case.18 In B.S., a mother sued after Somerset County 
Children and Youth Services obtained an order from a 
Pennsylvania state court judge transferring custody of her 
daughter to her father. We held that “[b]ecause the injury 
Mother claims is likewise traceable to [the defendants’] 
actions, as opposed to the state court orders those actions 
allegedly caused, we reject [the defendants’] contention that 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.”19 
  
Like in B.S., Plaintiffs here are not challenging the 
state court judgments, but the underlying policy that governed 
those judgments: the alleged policy of the New Jersey state 
courts of stripping parents of custody, in favor of the other 
parents, without a plenary hearing and employing an 
allegedly improper best-interests-of-the-child standard in such 
                                                 
17 Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (internal citations, 
quotation marks, and alterations removed). 
18 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013). 
19 Id. at 260. 
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proceedings. Thus, Rooker-Feldman does not bar suit.20 
 
III. Discussion 
 
 Plaintiffs challenge the two orders of the District Court 
granting the Defendants’ successive motions to dismiss on 
two bases.21 First, they appeal the District Court’s decision 
that Defendants were not proper parties to a suit brought 
under Section 1983. Second, they argue that the District Court 
should have granted them declaratory relief under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, arguing that jurisdiction under the 
Act is co-extensive with jurisdiction under Article III.22 
A. Are Defendant Judges Properly Sued under 
Section 1983? 
 
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are 
                                                 
20 Younger abstention, which requires federal abstention in 
limited cases involving parallel state proceedings, and the 
domestic relations exception also do not bar review of this 
case, for the same reasons cited by the District Court. See 
A19-21 (domestic relations exception); A21-24 (Younger 
abstention). 
21 The second motion was technically granted in part, but 
then became final when remaining claims were resolved.  
22 In addition to responding to Plaintiffs’ arguments, 
Defendants ask us to rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ 
complaint and find that on the merits Plaintiffs’ claims would 
not survive a motion to dismiss. We note, however, that the 
District Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims 
because it dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds.  
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generally ‘immune from a suit for money damages.’”23 
Although the Supreme Court in Pulliam v. Allen held that 
judicial immunity was not a bar to claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief under Section 1983,24 following this 
decision, in 1996, Congress passed the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act, amending Section 1983 with the intent to 
overrule Pulliam.25 The amended Section 1983 clarifies that 
“injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 
The amended language “does not expressly authorize suits for 
declaratory relief against judges. Instead, it implicitly 
recognizes that declaratory relief is available in some 
circumstances, and then limits the availability of injunctive 
relief to circumstances in which declaratory relief is 
unavailable or inadequate.”26 
  
Two key Third Circuit cases address whether judges 
are proper parties to a Section 1983 suit: Reynolds27 and 
                                                 
23 Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam)). 
24 466 U.S. 522, 540-42 (1984). 
25 Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 
197-8 (3d Cir. 2000).  
26 Id. at 197-98; see also id. at 198 (“The language is not an 
express authorization of declaratory relief, but simply a 
recognition of its availability or unavailability, depending on 
the circumstances, which the statute does not delineate.”). 
27 Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
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Georgevich.28 These cases apply a test borrowed from the 
First Circuit’s seminal case on this subject, In re Justices.29 
Under the In re Justices test, a judge who acts as a neutral and 
impartial arbiter of a statute is not a proper defendant to a 
Section 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute. This is because “[j]udges sit as arbiters without a 
personal or institutional stake on either side of [a] . . . 
controversy” and they “have played no role in [a] statute’s 
enactment, they have not initiated its enforcement, and they 
do not even have an institutional interest in following their 
prior decisions (if any) concerning its constitutionality if an 
authoritative contrary legal determination has subsequently 
                                                 
28 Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985) (en 
banc). Section 1983 was amended between the issuance of 
our decisions in Georgevich and Reynolds. However, 
Reynolds cited and distinguished Georgevich with no mention 
that the Section 1983 amendments had called part of its 
holding into question. Thus, we continue to apply its holding. 
In any event, Plaintiffs do not persuasively argue that 
injunctive and declaratory relief warrant different “proper 
party” treatment under the amended § 1983. See Wolfe v. 
Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 365-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing 
whether judicial-capacity judges were appropriate § 1983 
defendants in a suit seeking “prospective injunctive and 
declaratory relief”).  
29 In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 
17 (1st Cir. 1982). Although In re Justices was decided 
before Pulliam and before the 1996 amendment to Section 
1983, we have continued to adopt and apply its test. See 
Reynolds, 201 F.3d at 198.  
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been made.”30 However, a judge who acts as an enforcer or 
administrator of a statute can be sued under Section 1983 for 
declaratory or (if declaratory relief is unavailable) injunctive 
relief.31 
  
                                                 
30 Id. at 21; see also id. at 25 (“To require the Justices 
unnecessarily to assume the role of advocates or partisans on 
these issues would tend to undermine their role as judges. To 
encourage or even force them to participate as defendants in a 
federal suit attacking Commonwealth laws would be to 
require them to abandon their neutrality and defend as 
constitutional the very laws that the plaintiffs insist are 
unconstitutional—laws as to which their judicial 
responsibilities place them in a neutral posture. Indeed, a 
public perception of partiality might well remain even were 
the Justices to take no active part in the litigation. The result 
risks harm to the court's stance of institutional neutrality—a 
harm that appeal would come too late to repair.”). 
31 See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of Am., Inc., 446 
U.S. 719, 736 (1980) (holding that plaintiffs could sue judges 
in their enforcement capacities to enjoin them from enforcing 
bar membership requirements that the judges themselves 
promulgated); In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 23 (“In Consumers 
Union, unlike the case before us, the requirements under 
attack were promulgated by the judges themselves in the form 
of court rules; the judges had acted in a legislative capacity, 
which made their involvement in the litigation more direct 
and which gave them an institutional stake in the litigation’s 
outcome. It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court 
in Consumers Union . . . treated the judicial defendants as 
having acted in a nonadjudicatory (enforcement) capacity.”). 
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In Georgevich and Reynolds, we have twice applied 
the In re Justices test to determine whether state court judges 
could face suit under Section 1983, coming to two different 
outcomes based on the role and authority of the state court 
judges. In Georgevich, we held that state court judges who 
were administrators of the parole power under state statutes 
were proper parties to a Section 1983 suit challenging the 
constitutionality of those statutes.32 In so holding, we 
observed that “[t]he Pennsylvania statutory arrangement 
divides the authority to make parole decisions between the 
sentencing judges and the Board.”33 Thus, there was “no basis 
for distinguishing the role of the sentencing judges from that 
of the Board” and “no reason why the Board, but not the 
judges, may be sued on a similar challenge.”34 
 
In Reynolds, on the other hand, we found state court 
judges who had committed minors to involuntary drug and 
alcohol treatment services, as set forth by a state statute 
authorizing this commitment, to be improper defendants to a 
suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of 
the statute. We considered these judges to be neutral 
adjudicators, not enforcers or administrators of the statute.35 
As the judges did not initiate the proceedings under the 
                                                 
32 Georgevich, 772 F.2d at 1087 (“This is not a case in 
which judges are sued in their judicial capacity as neutral 
adjudicators of disputes . . . . Rather, the judges are sued as 
enforcers of the statutes, in other words as administrators of 
the parole power.”). 
33 Id. at 1088. 
34 Id. 
35 Reynolds, 201 F.3d at 199. 
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statute and were required to appoint counsel for the minors 
and order an assessment of each minor’s alleged drug and/or 
alcohol dependency, we held that “[t]he judge’s position in 
the . . . proceeding is simply not adverse to that of the 
minor.”36 We further explained that the informality of the 
process “[did] not alter the position of the judges as neutral 
arbiters.”37 We explicitly distinguished Georgevich: 
“although in Georgevich we held the judges amenable to suit 
under § 1983, our decision nevertheless recognized the 
impropriety of such suits where the judge acted as an 
adjudicator rather than an enforcer or administrator of a 
statute.”38  
 
Thus, the question here is whether, as the District 
Court found, the state court judges sued here are neutral 
arbiters of the New Jersey custody statute and its policies like 
the judges in Reynolds, or if instead they have enough latitude 
under the statute and policies that they become enforcers like 
the judge defendants in Georgevich. The answer is not clearly 
decided by our case law, as the proceedings at issue here do 
not have all of the same protections as those in Reynolds—
mainly, the mandatory appointment of counsel. 
 
Decisions from our sister Circuits applying the In Re 
Justices test help to clarify. In Grant v. Johnson,39 the Ninth 
Circuit found that a judge had acted in his adjudicative 
capacity by appointing a guardian for a person deemed 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 200. 
38 Id. at 199.  
39 15 F.3d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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mentally incompetent. Although the proceeding did not 
require notice or hearing, it was initiated by a third party (in 
this case, the plaintiff’s former husband) and was not initiated 
by the judge himself. Because the judge had acted in his 
adjudicative capacity, he was not a proper party to the suit. 
 
In Bauer v. Texas,40 the plaintiff sued the presiding 
judge of a probate court in his official capacity, seeking 
declaratory judgment under Section 1983 that Section 875 of 
the Texas Probate Code was unconstitutional. That Texas 
statute permitted the court to appoint a temporary guardian 
for an incapacitated person after three conditions were 
satisfied: 1) there was substantial evidence establishing 
probable cause, 2) an attorney was appointed to represent the 
incapacitated person, and 3) notice was given and a hearing 
was held. The Fifth Circuit found that “judicial 
determinations [under] section 875 are . . . clearly within a 
judge’s adjudicatory capacity, as this statute requires notice 
and a hearing, among other safeguards and limitations.”41 
Like in Grant, the Fifth Circuit further noted that the Texas 
court did not initiate the request for temporary guardianship.42 
Thus, it found that the state court judge was not a proper party 
to the suit.43 
 
 The First Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a suit 
                                                 
40 341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003). 
41 Id. at 360-61. 
42 Id. at 361. 
43 That decision ultimately rested its conclusion on Article 
III grounds, finding that there was no case or controversy, but 
is nonetheless relevant to our discussion. 
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even more similar to the present case, Nollet v. Justices of the 
Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.44 In 
Nollet, men who were litigants in domestic relations and/or 
abuse prevention matters in the trial courts of Massachusetts 
sued state court judges under Section 1983, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. They objected to state 
statutes that permitted the granting of temporary restraining 
orders at ex parte hearings.45 In spite of the “wide latitude” 
the state statutes gave the state court judges “in fashioning the 
conditions of both temporary and permanent restraining 
orders,” the judges were found to have acted in their 
adjudicatory capacity, “because the statute neither confers 
upon them the power to initiate actions, nor does it delegate 
to them any administrative functions.”46 
 
In this case, because we conclude that the judicial 
defendants have acted in an adjudicatory capacity and not in 
an enforcement capacity, they are not proper defendants. To 
be sure, the best-interests-of-the-child standard statute gives 
state court judges broad discretion to determine a custody 
situation. State court judges also have broad discretion to 
decide motions on the papers under New Jersey Supreme 
Court and Appellate Division precedent. However, like in 
Reynolds, Grant, Bauer, and Nollet, the state court judges 
themselves do not have any right to initiate these actions. 
Instead, a parent must initiate a custody dispute. Nor were the 
state court judges here given any administrative function. 
                                                 
44 83 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (unpublished per curiam table decision).  
45 Id. at 206. 
46 Id. at 211. 
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Moreover, the state court judges did not promulgate either the 
statutes or the judicial standards to which the Plaintiffs object. 
Furthermore, where the judge determines that there is a 
genuine issue as to a material fact relating to the custody 
dispute, a plenary hearing must be held, providing Plaintiffs 
with additional procedural safeguards. Thus, this case is more 
similar to Reynolds than Georgevich. Accordingly, the 
Defendants here are not proper parties to this action under 
Section 1983 for declaratory or injunctive relief.47 48 
B. Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in 
Failing to Exercise Jurisdiction under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act? 
 
Plaintiffs argue that even if the District Court 
determined that declaratory relief was unavailable under 
Section 1983, the District Court should have separately 
determined whether declaratory relief was available under the 
                                                 
47 Because we determine that the judges were not proper 
Section 1983 defendants for declaratory or injunctive relief, 
we need not reach or comment upon the District Court’s 
separate “available remedy at law” basis for denying 
injunctive relief.  
48 Plaintiffs argue that it was error for the District Court to 
dismiss the defendant judges as improper parties without 
specifying the “appropriate enforcement official” that would 
be a proper defendant to the action. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 26. 
But Plaintiffs do not offer any support for the assertion that 
the District Court was required to assist them in this way or 
otherwise to litigate on their behalf by identifying possible 
defendants to sue. 
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Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs argue that their case 
presents an Article III case or controversy,49 and that Article 
III jurisdiction and Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction are 
co-extensive.50 Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the In Re Justices 
test does not apply to declaratory relief under the Act—that 
the Act offers declaratory relief that is broader than that 
available under Section 1983.51 Plaintiffs further argue that 
the District Court erred in not considering the required factors 
before declining to exercise jurisdiction under the Act.52 
 
 The Declaratory Judgment Act states, in relevant part: 
 In a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, 
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be 
                                                 
49 Like the District Court and the First Circuit in In Re 
Justices, we decline to rest dismissal of this case on Article 
III grounds. See In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22 (“[W]e are 
reluctant to rest our decision directly on Article III when the 
case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”). 
50 Plaintiffs’ Brief at 28 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007) and Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), for the 
proposition that the phrase “case of actual controversy” in the 
Act refers to those “Cases” and “Controversies” that are 
justiciable under Article III). 
51 Id. at 29-30. 
52 Id. at 30. 
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sought. Any such declaration shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree 
and shall be reviewable as such.53 
 
Given “[t]he statute’s textual commitment to discretion, and 
the breadth of leeway we have always understood it to 
suggest,” district courts “possess discretion in determining 
whether and when to entertain an action under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise 
satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.”54 Both 
the Supreme Court and our Court have established certain 
non-exhaustive factors that, in an ordinary case, guide a 
district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction under the 
Act.55 Appellate courts review these discretionary 
determinations for abuse of discretion.56 
                                                 
53 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 
54 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282, 286-87 (citing Brillhart v. Excess 
Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)); see also id. at 287 
(“When all is said and done . . . the propriety of declaratory 
relief in a particular case will depend upon a circumspect 
sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and experience 
concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial 
power.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
55 Id. at 283, 289-90; Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 
129, 138 (3d Cir. 2014). 
56 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289; see also Reifer, 751 F.3d at 140 
(“Brillhart and Wilton stand for at least two broad principles: 
(1) that federal courts have substantial discretion to decide 
whether to exercise DJA jurisdiction, and (2) that this 
discretion is bounded and reviewable.”). 
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The Declaratory Judgment Act does not, however, 
provide an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction; it 
merely defines a remedy.57 The District Court thus properly 
understood that the Act does not render the state court judges 
appropriate defendants for declaratory relief, and the District 
Court properly applied the In re Justices test to Plaintiffs’ 
claims for declaratory relief. Because it correctly determined 
that the Defendants were not properly sued in this action, it 
did not need to consider whether to exercise its discretion 
using the factors we and the Supreme Court have articulated.  
 
                                                 
57 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 
671 (1950) (“Congress enlarged the range of remedies 
available in the federal courts but did not extend their 
jurisdiction.”); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 
835 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act “does not itself create an independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction but instead provides a remedy for 
controversies otherwise properly within the court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction”); Ne. Dep’t ILGWU Health & Welfare 
Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 
F.2d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Congress did not intend the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act . . . to extend the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). We note that the Act, 
which dates from 1934, see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 466 (1974), has been in effect for all of the “appropriate 
defendant” decisions that we now rely on.   
 
 
Case: 16-2644     Document: 003112660220     Page: 23      Date Filed: 06/27/2017
24 
 
IV. Conclusion 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
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